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BEST SUPPORTING ACTOR: REFINING
THE 509(A)(3) TYPE 3 CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATION
MARK RAMBLER
INTRODUCTION
Donors who contribute financially to certain charitable, educa-
tional, scientific, and religious organizations may receive tax deduc-
tions for their contributions.1 Although the reasons the government
foregoes these taxes are debated, the most widely accepted explana-
tion is that the government is subsidizing the charitable organizations
in return for the tangible and intangible societal benefits they pro-
vide.2 Because it is imperative that society receive the benefits the
government has subsidized, the analysis and improvement of Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) regulations pertaining to charitable organiza-
tions is a significant endeavor.
According to the IRS, these organizations are divided into “pub-
lic charities” and “private foundations.”3 The public charities defined
in Internal Revenue Code § 509(a) include universities, churches,
hospitals, museums, and ballet companies, and generally are engaged
in “inherently public activities,” meet one of several public support
tests, or support one of the above-noted organizations.4 These support
requirements each allow for some form of supervision by the general
Copyright © 2002 by Mark Rambler.
1. I.R.C. § 170 (1994).
2. John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions
Deduction, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 659, 682 (2001) (noting that many have written on
the § 170 deduction and explained it in several ways).
3. In this Note, “public charity” refers to the categories of charitable organizations listed
in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A). “Private foundation” refers to nonoperating private foundations.
4. I.R.C. § 509(a)(1)–(3); Victoria B. Bjorklund, Choosing Among the Private Foundation,
Supporting Organization and Donor-Advised Fund, in CHARITABLE GIVING TECHNIQUES 73,
86 (Comm. on Continuing Prof’l Educ., A.L.I.–A.B.A. 2001) (defining “inherently public activi-
ties”). Public charities also include organizations that test for public safety. I.R.C.
§ 509(a)(4).
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public, thus making substantial governmental oversight unnecessary.5
“Private foundations,” defined by the Code as organizations not de-
scribed in § 509(a), do not have to receive public support, and they
receive less favored tax status than public charities.6
The § 509(a)(3) “supporting organization” is a hybrid of the
public charity and the private foundation. Like private foundations
and unlike public charities, supporting organizations do not need to
satisfy any public support requirements.7 For tax deduction purposes,
however, supporting organizations are treated like public charities.8
Theoretically, supporting organizations escape private foundation
taxes and regulations because their close relationships with publicly
supported organizations ensure public supervision.9 Practically, this is
not always the case.
A recent settlement involving Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.,
illustrates how inadequate public supervision of supporting organiza-
tions can harm the public charities they are intended to support. Over
the past two decades, seven supporting organizations endowed by the
founders of Reader’s Digest magazine, Lila and DeWitt Wallace,
granted $900 million to public charities such as Lincoln Center, Colo-
nial Williamsburg, and Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center.10
On April 30, 2001, however, New York Attorney General Eliot Spit-
zer presided over a long-discussed settlement resulting in the dissolu-
5. William F., Mable E., and Margaret K. Quarrie Charitable Fund v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.
182, 190 (1978).
6. I.R.C. § 509. Although contributions to a private foundation are limited to 30% of the
donor’s adjusted gross income for cash contributions and 20% for contributions of appreciated
assets, the limits for contributions to supporting organizations are the same as for public chari-
ties: 50% and 30%, respectively. Id. § 170(b)(1). In addition, contributions of appreciated prop-
erty to public charities are deductible at fair market value, while they are limited to basis for
private foundations. Id. § 170(e)(1), (3). Also, the reporting requirements and the excise taxes
that restrict the activities of private foundations—on investment income, acts of self-dealing,
failure to distribute 5% of its assets annually, excess business holdings, investments that jeop-
ardize the foundation’s charitable purpose, and certain taxable expenditures—do not apply to
public charities. Id. §§ 4940–4948, 6033, 6056, 6685, 7207.
7. Id. § 509(a)(3).
8. Id. § 170(b)(1).
9. Quarrie Charitable Fund, 70 T.C. at 190.
10. Ralph Blumenthal, 13 Institutions Obtain Control of Vast Bequest, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2001, at A1. Among the organizations were the Lila Acheson Wallace Fund for the Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art, the Lila Acheson and DeWitt Wallace Fund for Lincoln Center, the
DeWitt Wallace Fund for Macalester College, the Lila Acheson and DeWitt Wallace Fund for
the Hudson Highlands, the DeWitt Wallace Fund for Colonial Williamsburg, the Lila Acheson
Wallace Fund for Wildlife Conservation, and the DeWitt Wallace Fund for Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center. Id.
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tion of all seven supporting organizations and the transfer of the or-
ganizations’ $1.7 billion endowment directly into the coffers of the
public charities.11 When Attorney General Spitzer finally announced
the settlement, he said, “There was a sense that there wasn’t as much
independence as the beneficiary-entities wanted.”12 It appears that
Attorney General Spitzer believed that Reader’s Digest executives
were exercising too much control over the supporting organizations’
decisionmaking, and, therefore, that the supporting organizations
were not properly “supporting” the public charities.
This Note discusses an element of supporting organizations that
commentators and courts have not addressed at length: the inade-
quacy of the “significant voice” requirement for Type 3 supporting
organizations.13 As long as the Internal Revenue Code treats sup-
porting organizations as public charities for tax deduction and tax ex-
emption purposes, all supporting organizations—including Type 3 or-
ganizations—must be responsive14 to the public charities they support.
This Note argues that, as defined by the regulations, a “significant
voice” does not guarantee enough responsiveness. The supported
public charities need a more effective instrument to ensure that they
receive the support that the government intends.
First, this Note discusses the origins of and the distinctions
among some charitable organizations. Although the legislative history
reveals that there was much disagreement among scholars and politi-
cians about the definitions of charitable organizations, it also exposes
some important common ground. Next, the Note discusses the Type 3
supporting organization and its problems. The Reader’s Digest set-
tlement demonstrates how a Type 3 supporting organization might be
manipulated to the public charity’s detriment. Last, the Note recom-
mends refining rather than eliminating the Type 3 structure. Al-
though tax counsel to the House Ways and Means Committee have
considered eliminating the Type 3 structure, this hybrid structure is a
11. Dewitt Wallace–Reader’s Digest Fund, Inc., Assurance of Discontinuance, Office of
the Attorney General of New York, ¶ 1.1, at 2 (Apr. 30, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal) (acquired by a request through the New York Freedom of Information Law); Blumenthal,
supra note 10, at A1.
12. Anne Marie Chaker, Reader’s Digest Funds Revamp, Give Control of Assets to Chari-
ties, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2001, at B4.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1981). A Type 3 supporting organiza-
tion is “operated in connection with” the supported public charity or charities. Id. § 1.509(a)-
4(i).
14. See infra Part II.B.
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useful element of charitable giving in the United States.15 This Note
recommends requiring that if a supporting organization is not a chari-
table trust, it be a membership corporation. The majority of this
membership corporation’s members should be appointed by sup-
ported public charities and should vote for the corporation’s direc-
tors. Although the members would not vote out directors often, this
power would be an important safeguard to ensure that the supporting
organization is responsive to the needs of the public charity that it
supports. This reform would help protect the Type 3 organization
from abuse while ensuring that philanthropists do not refrain from
creating Type 3 organizations for fear of having them dismantled by
authorities.
I.  HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
A. Private Foundation Abuses
Charity always has held a favored position in the United States’s
taxation scheme. In 1894, an income tax law first established the con-
cept of tax-exempt organizations.16 In 1913, when the individual in-
come tax was enacted,17 a charitable deduction proposal was re-
jected,18 but four years later, when the War Revenue Act included
high income tax rates to support the war, individuals were allowed to
deduct charitable contributions.19 Senator Henry Hollis explained that
the deduction was used to encourage philanthropy: “Usually people
contribute to charities and educational objects out of their surplus. . . .
Now, when war comes and we impose these very heavy taxes on in-
comes, that will be the first place where the wealthy men will be
15. Edited Transcript From the January 15, 1999 ABA Exempt Organizations Committee
Meeting, 24 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 67, 73 (1999) (statement of Tim Hanford). According to
Tim Hanford, who was tax counsel to the House Ways and Means Committee at the time,
“Some have suggested to us that we might consider elimination of the type three supporting or-
ganization on the theory that [it] is a fairly loose test for exemption from private foundation
status.” Id.
16. See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (“[N]othing herein contained
shall apply . . . to corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for
charitable, religious, or educational purposes . . . .”). One year later, for reasons unrelated to the
subject matter of charitable exemptions, §§ 27–37 of the Act were held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. Pollack v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635–37 (1895).
17. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114.
18. 50 CONG. REC. 1259 (1913).
19. War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330.
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tempted to economize, namely, in donations to charity.”20 Even
though the deduction decreased the amount of taxes collected, Con-
gress justified this depletion in 1938 “based upon the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropria-
tions from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promo-
tion of the general welfare.”21
The difference in tax treatment between charitable deductions
for donations to private foundations and to public charities has its
origins in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.22 Under that Code, do-
nors to hospitals, schools, and churches were subject to a 30% limita-
tion rather than the 20% limitation for other tax-exempt organiza-
tions.23 Congress explained that this benefit would encourage
contributions to these particular institutions.24 In 1964, the 30% group
was expanded to include organizations that received “substantial”
public support.25 Here, Congress explained that the purpose of this
additional deduction was to increase the immediately spendable con-
tributions to certain charitable organizations.26
Because these tax deductions divert money from the public
treasury to the charitable organizations, it is not surprising that the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 was hotly debated in Congress. This Act
proposed to create a definition of “private foundation” and distin-
guish this entity from public charities.27 Leading the charge for addi-
tional taxes and restrictions on private foundations was House
Banking and Currency Committee Chairman Wright Patman, who fo-
cused his grievances on the foundations’ politically charged projects.28
In some cases, Patman and other reactionary politicians wanted to
stop the larger foundations from pursuing esoteric scholarship and
20. 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938).
22. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3.
23. Id. § 170, 68A Stat. at 58.
24. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 29 (1954); see also S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 29 (1954), re-
printed in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4660 (citing “rising costs and the relatively low rate of return
[the institutions] are receiving on endowment funds” as reasons for encouraging contributions).
25. I.R.C. § 170 (1964).
26. S. REP. NO. 83-830, at 58 (1964).
27. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections
of the Internal Revenue Code).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1985, at 48–49 (1968).
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progressive change.29 Conservative members of Congress complained
that foundations were advocating against the Vietnam War, calling
for the abolition of the House Un-American Activities Committee,
and recommending admission of “Red China” to the United Na-
tions.30 Patman and his colleagues argued for restrictive antilobbying
laws that would prevent foundations—which were growing more and
more wealthy31—from formulating stances on social issues.32 Patman
was so fanatical that he was accused of manipulating congressional
procedure.33 Patman’s war against the evasion of “moral responsibility
to the Nation”34 has led to a characterization of these debates as “an
aberrant spasm of Congressional anger at foundations.”35
29. Some of the anger toward foundations is reminiscent of the more recent National En-
dowment for the Humanities debates:
While our cities decay, and while those of us not fortunate enough to merit the tax-
exempt status of the foundations pay a 10 percent surtax to keep the nation more or
less solvent, the Bollingen Foundation of New York City, a creation of the Mellon
banking family of Pittsburgh, spends tax-free dollars on such esoteric research sub-
jects as: “The works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal,” “The phenomenology of the Iran-
ian religious consciousness,” “The origin and significance of the decorative types of
medieval tombstones in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
115 CONG. REC. 22,605 (1969) (statement of Rep. Patman). But some of the resistance to foun-
dations had insidious racial overtones. For example, Representative John Ashbrook of Ohio
introduced statements that “it was the general view in Cleveland that the Ford Foundation had
materially affected the results” of the election in which Carl Stokes was elected mayor of
Cleveland; that the Ford Foundation had been “accused” of “exerting influence over key Board
of Education Members” in its New York City school decentralization project; that the Ford
Foundation had given substantial financial assistance to Harlem’s Intermediate School 201, “de-
spite continuous manifestations of anti-Semitism, racism and violence”; and that the Ford
Foundation set a goal “to increase the number of Negro members of Congress from nine to 30.”
Id. at 4960 (statement of Rep. Ashbrook). Representative Albert Watson of South Carolina la-
mented that while the Ford Foundation’s programs claimed to be “educational,” they in fact
promoted “racial strife.” Id. at 10,888 (statement of Rep. Watson).
30. E.g., id. at 29,507 (statement of Rep. Blackburn).
31. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 17,966 (1968) (statement of Rep. Madden) (reporting that a
study by the Treasury Department found that 596 foundations under evaluation were valued at
$10.2 billion in 1960, as compared to $15.1 billion in 1966).
32. E.g., 115 CONG. REC. 22,611 (1969) (statement of Rep. Boland).
33. Representative Silvio Conte, ranking minority member of the House Small Business
Subcommittee on Foundations, said:
I rise to point out in fact that I do not have the slightest knowledge or information
about what my subcommittee is investigating. . . . [T]he only time I ever hear anything
about the activities of my Foundations Subcommittee is when I pick up the paper to
see that Chairman Patman has issued another installment of his treatise.
114 CONG. REC. 8382 (1968) (statement of Rep. Conte).
34. 115 CONG. REC. 22,603 (1969) (statement of Rep. Patman).
35. Thomas Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspective on its Origins
and Underpinnings, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 20, 2000; see also 115 CONG. REC. 22,611 (1969)
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But while Patman and his followers may have been overzealous
in punishing foundations for “moral” abuses, they were justified in
policing the foundations’ fiscal abuses. Several Treasury Department
reports carefully detailed serious mistreatments of the charitable de-
ductions by some foundations. For example, a 1965 Treasury report
revealed that although a preponderant number of private foundations
were performing their functions without subverting the tax laws, a
minority operated abusively.36 These abuses included self-dealing be-
tween foundations and those who controlled them, undue delay in the
distribution of foundation income, and excessive foundation involve-
ment in business.37 The debates for the Tax Reform Act of 1969 also
included discussion of another Treasury report that described 154 in-
dividuals who earned at least $200,000 each in 1966, but manipulated
charitable deductions so that they did not pay any income tax.38
Conservative and progressive members of Congress found com-
mon ground on closing the loopholes identified by the Treasury De-
partment. Even Senator Charles Goodell, who believed the laws pre-
venting private foundations from any lobbying-like actions
represented “a punitive attack upon the very essence of private phil-
anthropic activities in this country,” urged reform.39 “For sure,” Goo-
dell said, “certain areas of foundation tax treatment are in need of
overhaul. There have been a number of foundation abuses which
must be corrected. Self-dealing between a foundation and its donors
must be prohibited. The misuse of tax exemption for private influence
or gain should be curtailed.”40 Politicians on both sides of the aisle
agreed that the incidents of self-dealing and fraudulent transactions in
private foundations had to be eliminated.41
(statement of Rep. Boland) (observing that “[s]ome are angry with foundations and say it is ac-
ceptable to punish them”).
36. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 89TH CONG., TREASURY REPORT ON
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 5–10 (Comm. Print 1965).
37. Id.
38. 115 CONG. REC. 22,577 (1969) (statement of Rep. Ullman).
39. Id. at 26,508 (statement of Sen. Goodell).
40. Id.
41. See also Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearing on H.R. 13270 Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
91st Cong. 10 (1969) (statement of Dan Throop Smith, Professor of Finance, Harvard Univer-
sity):
As regards private foundations, the prohibitions on self-dealing seem thoroughly rea-
sonable and desirable. There have been significant abuses and the proposed con-
straints would not appear to hamper any reasonable objectives of foundations. The
same statement seems valid with respect to the limitation on stock ownership and the
use of assets . . . .
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B. Donor Control of Private Foundations
While politicians poured over the Treasury reports offering sta-
tistical evidence to support policing private foundations, they also
considered the foundation structure. This structure is more suscepti-
ble to donor abuse than the public-charity structure because donors
can retain some control over foundations in ways they cannot retain
control over public charities. One commentator has explained the dif-
ference between private foundations and public charities as Congress
saw it in 1969:
The very nature of the private foundation made it peculiarly vulner-
able to use for personal purposes. Typically established by one indi-
vidual or family, endowed solely from their funds, and devoted to
purposes which they selected, private foundations were likely to be
dominated entirely by their donors during the donors’ lives and, for
at least some substantial period after their deaths, by their families
or narrow groups of trusted associates. . . . As a practical matter,
subject only to the outside chance of an IRS audit—before 1969 a
very outside chance indeed—foundations’ operations commonly
were carried on from year to year without the knowledge, interest,
or intervention of any outside party. . . . The nature of public chari-
ties, on the other hand, was generally quite different. Ordinarily
they were controlled by—or, at a minimum, open to the review and
intervention of—parties independent of any single donor.42
For a charitable organization to qualify as a public charity, it would
have to be subject to the “intervention” of parties independent of the
donor. This “intervention” would be necessary to ensure that the do-
nor did not directly or indirectly control the foundation. As early as
1964, House Banking and Currency Committee Chairman Wright
Patman focused on the control permitted by the private foundation:
Patman: Would you agree that it is a simple matter for anyone to
form a foundation as a trust or non-profit corporation under state
law and personally to designate the trustees or directors to manage
its affairs?
Harding: I think that is right, yes, sir.
. . .
42. Troyer, supra note 35 (emphasis added).
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Patman: Would you agree that there is ample evidence that some
donors find it hard to forget that the foundation’s assets once be-
longed to them?
Harding: I think that we have seen some of that, yes, Mr. Chair-
man.
. . .
Patman: Would you agree that, when directors of a foundation
are selected because of their familial relationship or personal loyalty
to the donor, it is too much to expect that they will rigidly adhere [to
fiduciary standards] in approving the donor’s self-dealing?
Harding: I think it raises a very difficult problem, Mr. Chair-
man.43
Throughout this exchange, Patman’s constant references to the do-
nors’ control demonstrate his concern that the donors received bene-
fits at the expense of the public fisc.
Today, “control” remains an important reason tax-deduction
policy treats public charities more favorably than private foundations.
One example of how the current Code uses “control” to distinguish
the two entities is found in a regulation that requires a private foun-
dation to transfer all its assets to a public charity upon dissolution.44
This regulation allows the private foundation to escape taxation un-
der § 507(c) as long as the private foundation donor does not “con-
trol” the contribution. The regulation prevents this control by pre-
cluding the donor from creating a “material” restriction that would
prevent the public charity “from freely and effectively employing the
transferred assets, or the income derived therefrom, in furtherance of
its exempt purposes.”45 Whether a restriction is “material” depends
on the particular facts and circumstances, including
(A) Whether the public charity (including a participating trustee,
custodian, or agent in the case of a community trust) is the owner in
fee of the assets it receives from the private foundation; (B)
Whether such assets are to be held and administered by the public
charity in a manner consistent with one or more of its exempt pur-
poses; (C) Whether the governing body of the public charity has the
ultimate authority and control over such assets, and the income de-
43. Tax Exempt Foundations and Their Impact on Small Business: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Founds. of the House Select Comm. on Small Bus., 88th Cong. 281–83
(1964) (statements of Rep. Patman and Bertrand Harding, Acting Commissioner, IRS).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2 (as amended in 1981).
45. Id. § 1.507-2(a)(8)(1).
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rived therefrom; and (D) Whether, and to what extent, the govern-
ing body of the public charity is organized and operated so as to be
independent from the transferor.46
Here, it is clear that the public charity must exercise control over a
taxpayer’s contribution to qualify the contribution as a deduction.47 A
deduction for donating to a public charity is justified only when the
public charity exercises “full control” sufficient to guarantee the
charity discretionary use of donated funds to carry out the charity’s
functions and purposes.48
This “control” element is also important in the international
framework. For instance, contributions to a domestic organization
that transmits all or some of its funds to foreign transferees will be
deductible only if the board of directors of the domestic organization
has “discretion and control” over the use of the contributions.49
Therefore, the practical decision of whether a donor should cre-
ate a private foundation or an organization that qualifies for better
tax treatment depends on the amount of control the donor wants.
One commentator explains:
The main advantage of a private foundation over the alternatives
can be summarized in one word: Control. . . . If the donor is willing
to give up some or all control over her gift, she can gain other ad-
vantages, including greatly reduced administrative responsibilities
and costs. For a donor who is committed to becoming a philanthro-
pist, no alternative other than the private foundation may provide a
degree of control sufficient to allow the donor to achieve her goals
. . . . This broadest latitude is the reason that private foundations are
recognized as the free agents of the charitable world: They are not
answerable to large public memberships or required continuously to
raise funds, as are most public charities.50
This “latitude” allows a foundation donor to provide in the founda-
tion’s governing documents as few or as many restrictions as desired.
46. Id.
47. Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10, 11.
48. Id.; see also Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 562–66 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that
taxpayers could otherwise earmark funds and, by characterizing the contributions as charitable
contributions, receive deductions for what are in fact personal gifts). Section 262 of the Internal
Revenue Code proscribes the deduction of personal expenses, which include personal gifts.
I.R.C. § 262 (1994).
49. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-031 (Dec. 20, 1996) (citing Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48).
50. Bjorklund, supra note 4, at 78–79.
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For example, “the founder of a family foundation can include a provi-
sion requiring that at least 60% of the directors or trustees be his or
her direct lineal descendants.”51
Donor control of supporting organizations can give these donors
inequitable tax advantages, such as the ability to accelerate the tax
benefits of future years’ charitable contributions. A donor who wants
to offset high income in a particular year would contribute the maxi-
mum deductible amount to her supporting organization and, through
her control of the supporting organization, arrange for the use of the
supporting organization’s assets to make charitable gifts in later
years.52 Congress did not worry much about abuses like these in public
charities because the public-charity structure was inherently more
“responsive to the needs of the public.”53
C. Supporting Organizations
The legislative history of supporting organizations is scant. The
fervent 1969 private foundation hearings, which included the testi-
mony of dozens of university presidents, law professors, scientists,
and chief executives, never addressed the particulars of § 509(a)(3).54
In his testimony, Logan Wilson, president of the American Council
on Education, merely stated that § 509(a)(3) was “included in an at-
tempt to exclude from the definition of ‘private foundation’ entities
which are in fact organized, operated and controlled in the public in-
terest.”55 The Senate Report included only a brief explanation:
In general, the problems that gave rise to the statutory provisions of
the bill discussed above appear to be especially prevalent in the case
of some organizations presently in the 20-percent group. However, it
appears that certain other organizations presently in the 20-percent
51. Robert A. Boisture & Lloyd H. Mayer, Weighing the Alternatives: Private Foundations,
11 J. TAX’N EXEMPT ORG. 257, 257 (2000).
52. The “donor-advised fund” (DAF) may permit this very situation. Bjorklund, supra note
4, at 101–03. With the DAF, the donor makes nonbinding recommendations to the fund as to
which charitable organization should receive grants from the fund. Id. at 103. Although a discus-
sion of DAFs is outside the scope of this Note, it is interesting to note that the IRS recently has
stressed that in order to qualify for public-charity status, a DAF “must have appropriate control
over the donated assets.” Id. at 104.
53. H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 41 (1969); S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 57 (1969).
54. Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the House Comm. on Fin., 91st
Cong. 115–43, 218–20 (1969).
55. Id. at 34 (statement of Logan Wilson, President, American Council on Education).
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category generally do not give rise to the problems which have led to
the restrictions and limitations described above.56
In passing such a huge law in such a short time,57 Congress did not
consider supporting organizations in detail. Section 509(a)(3) sup-
porting organizations were deemed to be the kind of organizations
that should not be considered private foundations simply because in
theory they should not have, as the Senate Report stated, the “prob-
lems which have led to the restrictions and limitations” on private
foundations.
The supporting organization recently has become a popular
charitable organization.58 These § 509(a)(3) organizations are attrac-
tive because they are flexible organizations that are not subject to the
taxes and restrictions of private foundations.59 Although the regula-
tions governing supporting organizations are, according to one fed-
eral judge, “fantastically intricate and detailed,” they are simple
enough when explained.60 In return for increased tax benefits and
freedom from restrictions, supporting organizations are subject to
three tests: the “organizational test,” the “control test,” and the “op-
erational test.” To qualify as a supporting organization, not as a pri-
vate foundation, a supporting organization must meet each of the
elements of the three tests.
The organizational test requires that the organization’s articles of
incorporation: (1) limit the purposes of such organization to one or
more purposes set forth in § 509(a)(3)(A) of the Code; (2) not ex-
pressly empower the organization to engage in activities that are not
56. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 56 (1969). The House Report said even less. See H. REP. NO. 91-
413, at 40 (1969) (explaining that the new § 509 included “adjustments to [‘private foundation’]
in order to adapt it to the objectives of this part of the bill”).
57. See 115 CONG. REC. 22,613 (1969) (statement of Rep. Casey) (noting that the bill ex-
ceeded 350 pages in length, had a two-part committee report that is several hundred complex
pages in length, and involved the reallocation of $7 billion in tax liability); id. at 22,579 (state-
ment of Rep. Utt) (noting that Congress moved “like a race horse in the final 10 days just to get
something, anything to the floor” and that “there were massive changes made 2 days before we
reported the bill—and some corrections after it was reported—and we were given 1 day after
reporting the bill to file any minority or additional views”).
58. Carolyn M. Osteen et al., Scams, Shams, and Scandals—Exempt Organizations Devel-
opments in 1999, in 1 LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 369, 372 (Comm. on
Continuing Prof’l Educ., A.L.I.–A.B.A. 2000); Monica Langley, The SO Trend: How to Succeed
in Charity Without Really Giving, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1998, at A1 (describing supporting or-
ganizations as “a suddenly hot charitable vehicle”).
59. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on private foundations).
60. Windsor Found. v. United States, No. 76-0441-R, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13643, at *5
(E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1977).
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in furtherance of the purposes referred to in § 509(a)(3)(A) of the
Code; (3) name the publicly supported organizations on behalf of
which such organization is operated; and (4) not expressly empower
the organization to operate to support or benefit entities other than
those named.61
The control test requires that the supporting organization not be
controlled (control is defined as 50% voting power or veto power)
“directly or indirectly by one or more disqualified persons,” other
than foundation managers or § 509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2) organizations.62
A “disqualified person” is (1) a substantial contributor (contributing
more than $5,000 or 2% of the total contributions received by the
supporting organization); (2) a person with more than a 20% interest
in a corporation, partnership, trust, or unincorporated enterprise that
is a substantial contributor to the supporting organization; (3) a fam-
ily member of any individual described in (1) or (2); or (4) a corpora-
tion, partnership, trust, or estate in which a person described in (1),
(2), or (3) has more than a 35% interest.63
The operational test requires the supporting organization to en-
gage solely in activities that support or benefit the specified publicly
supported organization described in § 509(a)(1) or (2). Furtherance of
any purpose other than supporting or benefiting the specified organi-
zation would prevent qualification.64 The operational test also re-
quires that a supporting organization be “operated, supervised, or
controlled by or in connection with one or more organizations de-
scribed in [§ 509(a)(1) or (2)]” of the Internal Revenue Code.65 This
requirement creates three different types of supporting organiza-
tions.66 Type 1 supporting organizations are “operated, supervised, or
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(c)(1) (as amended in 1981).
62. I.R.C. § 509(a)(3)(C) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(j)(1); see, e.g., IRS Exemption
Ruling, Atid XXXIII Foundation, May 19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 421334 (deciding that a
foundation does not qualify under I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) when its donor members are “likely to be
substantial contributors” and when these members sit on the board of trustees); IRS Exemption
Ruling, Atid XXXIV Foundation, May 19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 421336 (same); IRS Ex-
emption Ruling, Atid XXXV Foundation, May 19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 427325 (same).
63. I.R.C. § 4946.
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(e)(1). A supporting organization’s expansion of its governing
documents to include new supported organizations is consistent with Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-
4(e)(1). Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-42-030 (July 17, 1998).
65. I.R.C. § 509(a)(3)(B).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(2).
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controlled by” the supported organization.67 Type 2 supporting or-
ganizations are “supervised or controlled in connection with” the
supported organization.68 Type 3 supporting organizations, however,
are only “operated in connection with” a publicly supported organiza-
tion.69
Although donors and advisers often prefer Type 3 supporting or-
ganizations because this type allows less control by the publicly sup-
ported organization than the other two types, there is a price to be
paid for this increased donor autonomy.70 A Type 3 organization must
meet two additional tests that are not required of Type 1 and Type 2
organizations: the “integral part test” and the “responsiveness test.”
The integral part test requires that the Type 3 supporting organiza-
tion maintain “significant involvement” in the operations of the pub-
licly supported organization, and that the publicly supported organi-
zation depend on the Type 3 supporting organization for the specific
support it provides.71
67. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(g)(1). The relationship between the supporting organization and the
supported organization is akin to that between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. The sup-
ported organization’s governing body or membership must elect or appoint a majority of the
supporting organization’s officers, directors, or trustees. Id.
68. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(h)(1). Here, the supporting organization and the supported organiza-
tion have a brother-sister relationship. The supporting organization must be controlled by the
same individuals who control the publicly supported organization. Id. For example, the sup-
ported organization’s board members would serve on the board of the supporting organization.
69. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(1)(i).
70. Gerald B. Treacy, Jr., Is IRS Taking Closer Look at Supporting Organizations?,
CHARITABLE GIFT PLAN. NEWS, July/Aug. 2000, at 2, 5.
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(i). This test may be met in one of two ways. The first op-
tion, known as the “functional support test,” is based on the nature of the activities the sup-
porting organization engages in to support the supported organization. The functional support
test dictates that the Type 3 supporting organization’s activities benefit the supported organiza-
tion by performing its functions or carrying out its purposes and that, but for the involvement of
the supporting organization, these activities would be performed by the publicly supported or-
ganization. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(ii).
Another way for a Type 3 to fulfill the integral part test is the “financial support test,”
which is based on the supporting organization’s financial support for the supported organiza-
tion. In the financial support test, the supporting organization first must show that it pays sub-
stantially all of its income to, or for the use of, the publicly supported organization. Id. “Sub-
stantially all” of the organization’s income has been determined to be at least 85%. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2000-45-033 (Aug. 15, 2000); Rev. Rul. 76-208, 1976-1 C.B. 161, 162 (relying on Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4942(b)-1(c)).
Then, the supporting organization must show that this support is sufficient to ensure
the publicly supported organization’s “attentiveness” to the supporting organization’s opera-
tions. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii). The regulations do not specify what percentage of a
supported organization’s support must be received, but the IRS has stated that, alone, less than
10% would not be likely to ensure attentiveness. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,379 (Aug. 15, 1975).
RAMBLER.DOC 03/01/02 1:15 PM
2002] 509(A)(3) SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION 1381
This Note proposes that the second required test, the respon-
siveness test, be refined. The responsiveness test is intended to assure
revenue officials that the supporting organization receives sufficient
input from the supported charitable organization. The regulations ex-
plain two alternative ways to demonstrate that the management of
the supporting organization is responsive to the needs of the sup-
ported organization and therefore meets this responsiveness test.72
One way for a Type 3 supporting organization to fulfill the respon-
siveness test is the “accountability test.” The accountability test es-
tablishes the supporting organization as a charitable trust under state
law for the benefit of the supported organization, with the supported
organization having the right to enforce the trust.73
The other way to fulfill the responsiveness test is the “interrela-
tionship test.” This test is flawed and should be changed. Currently,
the interrelationship test requires that the officers, directors, or trus-
tees of the supported organization have a “significant voice” in the
activities of the supporting organization. A “significant voice” re-
quires one of the following to be true:
a) One or more officers, directors, or trustees of the supporting
organization are elected or appointed by the officers, directors, trus-
tees, or membership of the publicly supported organizations; [or]
b) One or more members of the governing bodies of the publicly
supported organizations are also officers, directors or trustees of, or
hold other important offices in, the supporting organizations; or
c) The officers, directors, or trustees of the supporting organiza-
tion maintain a close and continuous working relationship with the
This test can be used only if the supporting organization engages in activities (for example, per-
forming publishing or printing functions for a college) as opposed to simply making grants.
72. The third way to meet the responsiveness test, the “historic relationship test,” states
that if before November 20, 1970, an organization was supporting or benefiting an organization
described in I.R.C. § 509(a)(1) or (2), “additional facts and circumstances, such as a historic and
continuing relationship,” may be taken into account. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(1)(ii). This
regulation will not be discussed because this Note focuses on the future creation of supporting
organizations.
73. This accountability test is met if:
 a) The supporting organization is a charitable trust under state law;
 b) Each specified publicly supported organization is a named beneficiary under
such charitable trust’s governing instrument; and
 c) The beneficiary organization has the power to enforce the trust and compel an
accounting under state law.
Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-(4)(i)(2)(iii).
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officers, directors or trustees of the publicly supported organiza-
tions.74
Then, once one of the above relationships is established, the or-
ganization must demonstrate that, because of the relationship, “the
officers, directors or trustees of the publicly supported organization
have a significant voice in the investment policies of the supporting
organization, the timing of grants, the manner of making [the grants,]
. . . and in otherwise directing the use of the income or assets of [the]
supporting organization.”75
Herein lies the trouble. The interrelationship test clearly aims to
establish that the supported public charity has a great deal of influ-
ence—a “significant voice” in the day-to-day operations of the sup-
porting organization. A “significant voice” is necessary because since
the Type 3 supporting organization receives public-charity status, it
must be responsive to the needs of the supported public charity from
which it derives its status. The donors who are receiving benefits as if
they are contributing to public charities should not be able to control
the supporting organization to the public charity’s detriment.
Although “significant voice” is a desired state of affairs, the law
requires only a single public-charity director on the supporting or-
ganization’s board.76 This might be enough, but it might not, and the
IRS does not have the time or the resources to analyze the inner
workings of supporting organization boardrooms for evidence of a
“significant voice.”77 A survey of recent private letter rulings demon-
strates that the IRS does not apply this analysis.78 Even if the IRS
could accomplish such analysis, it is easy for corporate officers prone
to fraudulent behavior to create phony evidence by, for example,
planting comments into the minutes of board meetings.
74. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii)(a), (b), (c). Private Letter Ruling 98-37-037 describes a compli-
cated relationship that the IRS approved. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-037 (June 18, 1998).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii)(d).
76. The IRS has ruled that mere representation on an organization’s selection committee
for making grants does not meet this responsiveness test if an independent trustee has sole and
complete authority over all other aspects of the trust’s administration. Rev. Rul. 75-437, 1975-2
C.B. 218, 219–20.
77. See, e.g., Carolyn Wright, IRS Has High Hopes for Intermediate Sanctions, Owens Says,
TAX NOTES TODAY, June 10, 1996 (noting that, “in a good year,” the IRS audits ten thousand
exempt organizations with fewer than one hundred of these reviews being comprehensive).
78. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-52-088 (Dec. 29, 1999) (explaining that the responsiveness
test is satisfied merely “if one or more of the trustees of the publicly supported organization are
also trustees of, or hold important offices in, the supporting organization”).
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II.  PROBLEMS WITH SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS
Contrary to Congress’s intent, Type 3 supporting organizations
seem to be demonstrating some of the “problems which have led to
the restrictions and limitations” on private foundations.79 In fact, in
two recent instances, Congress has demonstrated that it does not have
faith in Type 3 supporting organizations. In the Agricultural Risk
Protection Act of 2000, Congress empowered the government to
make certain payments to any organization that “is described in sec-
tion 509(a)(3) of [the Internal Revenue Code] and is controlled by an
organization described in section 509(a)(2).”80 And in some tempo-
rary tax provisions concerning charitable deductions for real prop-
erty, Congress stated that “an organization that is not itself publicly
supported but nevertheless is qualified as a ‘public charity’ (under
[§ 509(a)(3)]) would be eligible if it is controlled by a government or
publicly supported organization.”81 In each case, Congress’s insertion
of “control” language clearly indicates that it wants to ensure that a
Type 3 organization, which a public charity would not control, is not
used.
Tim Hanford, tax counsel to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, has said that Type 3 supporting organizations “look an awful
lot like private foundations.”82 Hanford explained that Congress was
wary of Type 3 organization abuses:
We have become aware recently, or over the long term, depending
on your perspective, that there have been arrangements developed
that give donors substantially all of the tax benefits of contributing
to a public charity, [and] substantially all of the control of contrib-
uting to a private foundation, without any of the rules that apply to
private foundations . . . .83
A. Reader’s Digest
In 1998, the New York Attorney General began investigating
one such double benefit arrangement with Reader’s Digest’s sup-
79. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
80. Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-224, § 211(a)(2)(D), 114 Stat.
358, 406 (emphasis added).
81.  S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 14 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736, 6749–50 (em-
phasis added).
82. Edited Transcript From the January 15, 1999 ABA Exempt Organizations Committee
Meeting, supra note 15, at 73.
83. Id. at 72.
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porting organizations.84 At the time, Reader’s Digest Association,
Inc., already was mired in potential conflicts of interest. It was re-
ported that the company’s board of directors was “in the grip” of
Reader’s Digest chief executive George Grune.85 Grune was able to
control the board because he was also chairman of the Lila Wallace–
Reader’s Digest Fund, Inc., and the DeWitt Wallace–Reader’s Digest
Fund, Inc., private foundations the Wallaces created in 1969.86 The
Wallaces designed the two funds to maintain control of Reader’s Di-
gest Association, Inc., by having the funds hold a large amount of the
company’s stock.87 In 1998, the funds held 71% of the company’s
voting shares,88 and four of the funds’ five directors served on
Reader’s Digest’s board or were paid by the company.89 The directors
could not be ousted by the shareholders because the shareholders
were the directors.90 Because the funds held 71% of the voting shares
of Reader’s Digest, whoever controlled the funds essentially con-
trolled the company.
84. Jon Elsen, Vacco Probes Why Mag’s Woes Are Hard to Digest, N.Y. POST, Feb. 4, 1998.
85. Stacy Perman, A Sad Story at the Digest, TIME, Mar. 2, 1998, at 58. Grune served as
chief executive of Reader’s Digest from 1984 to 1994 and retired as its chairman in 1995.
READER’S DIGEST, INC., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
In 1997, James Schadt resigned as chief executive and Grune returned as “interim” chief execu-
tive. Perman, supra, at 58.
86. Joann S. Lublin & G. Bruce Knecht, Tenure of Reader’s Digest Acting CEO Is Unab-
breviated, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1998, at B1. George Grune had been chairman of the funds since
1984, after the death of Lila Wallace, who had survived her husband. Id.
87. Vince Stehle, Falling Price of Reader’s Digest Stock Is Big Blow to Wallace Funds,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 26, 1998, at 21, 21. The Wallaces had drawn up their wills hastily
just two months before the Tax Reform Act of 1969 went into effect, limiting the amount of
stock of a single company that a private foundation could hold to 20%. Id. Since foundations are
permitted fifteen years after the death of a donor to dispose of excess business holdings, and
Lila Wallace, who survived her husband, died in 1984, the two funds had to reduce their voting
shares percentage down to 50% or less by 2000. Id.; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-16-003 (Oct. 31,
1989). This Private Letter Ruling, acquired via a New York Freedom of Information Law re-
quest, includes names and numbers redacted from the published version and is on file with the
Duke Law Journal.
88. Richard Teitelbaum, The Plot to Shake Up Reader’s Digest, FORTUNE, Mar. 2, 1998, at
44. In 1999, that percentage was decreased to 50% to avoid tax penalties for excess business
holdings that would go into effect fifteen years after the 1984 death of the donor, Lila Wallace.
Lila Acheson & DeWitt Wallace Fund for the Hudson Highlands, IRS Form 990 (1997) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal). Still, this is more than the 20% allowed in funds set up after the
1969 law. In a 1989 private letter ruling, the IRS considered excess business holdings issues and
blessed the Reader’s Digest pre–initial public offering reorganization, which made the funds
majority controlling shareholders. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-16-003, supra note 87. A different decision
would have gone a long way toward avoiding the conflict of interest problems discussed herein.
89. Teitelbaum, supra note 88, at 44.
90. Id.
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Other charitable entities held a significant percentage of
Reader’s Digest stock: the seven supporting organizations (SOs).91
Significantly, Grune sat on the board of each of the seven SOs.92
These seven SOs supported thirteen public charities: Colonial Wil-
liamsburg; Macalester College; Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer
Center; the Metropolitan Museum of Art; the Open Space Institute;
the Scenic Hudson Land Trust, Inc.; the Wildlife Conservation Soci-
ety; the Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc.; the New York City
Ballet, Inc.; the New York City Opera, Inc.; Vivian Beaumont Thea-
ter, Inc.; Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York, Inc.; and the
Chamber Music Society of Lincoln Center, Inc.93
When Reader’s Digest was paying healthy dividends and its
stock price was rising, the interests of the funds and the company
were aligned perfectly. But in the last ten years, Reader’s Digest had
seen its subscriber base age and its most popular product lose ap-
peal.94 By January 1998, the company was faltering.95 Soon, the stock
price dropped to about half of its 1992 high of $56.38.96 And due to
deteriorating earnings, Reader’s Digest had cut its dividends by 50%
in the summer of 1997.97
The declining stock price and the slashed dividends greatly af-
fected the SOs, the assets of which in 1997 were 50.7% Reader’s Di-
gest stock.98 At their height in 1992, the shares held by the seven SOs
were worth $1.85 billion, but by the end of 1997 they were worth
91. These seven SOs owned a total of 42% of the nonvoting shares. Geraldine Fabrikant,
Faith Ebbs on Reader’s Digest Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at D1.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Wendy Bounds, Reader’s Digest Parent Struggles over Table of Contents, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 1998, at B4.
95. Between 1993 and 1998, subscriptions in the United States had fallen by a million, and
when the magazine was not prospering, the rest of the company’s ventures—books, music, and
videos—could not profit either. Perman, supra note 85, at 58. In 1998, the company announced
that operating profits had fallen for four straight years, and that earnings had decreased for the
sixth straight quarter. Id.
96. Id.
97. Linda Sandler, Charitable Funds’ Sale of Reader’s Digest Shares at a Substantial Dis-
count Is Raising Questions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1998, at C2. At a December 1997 shareholders
meeting, shareholders were “angry” and “demanded” that Reader’s Digest change management
and cut its dividend again. Jon Elsen, Shareholders Tear into Reader’s Digest, N.Y. POST, Dec.
13, 1997, at 16.
98. Geraldine Fabrikant, Cultural World Gets Painful Lesson in Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 1997, at D4.
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$1.15 billion less.99 In addition, the 1997 halving of the dividends
caused the combined annual income of the SOs to fall from $58.7
million to $29.4 million.100 This single stock was ruining some of the
country’s most venerable public charities.
The public charities had wanted to diversify for years.101 Any so-
phisticated public charity would not want large amounts of funds in
undiversified form—especially in a single stock that was decreasing in
value. But after an initial 1990 public offering of Reader’s Digest
stock, and a secondary offering a year later, the SOs did not sell any
stock for seven years.102 Throughout the 1990s, the company stock fell
as the stock market soared; indeed, it was only the SOs’ not selling
that prevented the company’s stock price from falling further.103 The
New York Times determined the performance of each SO’s portfolio
over a period in which they did not buy or sell any Reader’s Digest
stock. The results were eye-opening. For example, during the bull
market from the end of fiscal 1991 to the end of fiscal 1997, the value
of the Reader’s Digest stock for Wildlife Conservation Society, the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, and Lincoln Center lost 17%.104 The
change in value of the three SOs’ other investments were all positive:
71%, 48%, and 24%, respectively.105
The reason the SOs did not sell the Reader’s Digest stock has
never been disclosed, but the supported charities should have had
more power to influence this decision. Had they diversified, the chari-
ties potentially could have saved hundreds of millions of dollars.106
The media have speculated that one reason the SOs did not sell
their stock was that they were “affiliates” of Reader’s Digest.107 If the
99. Stehle, supra note 87, at 21.
100. Teitelbaum, supra note 88, at 44.
101. Perman, supra note 85, at 58; see also Fabrikant, supra note 91, at D1 (“Many of the
cultural beneficiaries had been pushing for the right to sell some of their shares . . . .”). None of
the beneficiaries would speak to this on the record, citing confidentiality agreements that were
signed in last year’s settlement. Interview with James E. Nicholson, Partner, Faegre & Benson,
representing Michael S. McPherson, President of Macalester College (Oct. 8, 2001).
102. Blumenthal, supra note 10, at A1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. (explaining that the supporting organizations were “restricted under federal se-
curities law from freely trading the stock without the Digest’s permission” and that the organi-
zations “would have been permitted to sell 1 percent of their Digest holdings every three
months”); Fabrikant, supra note 91, at D1 (explaining that “the Government restricts the sale of
a big block of stock held by an affiliate”).
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SOs were, in fact, affiliates, they would be limited by federal securi-
ties law in the volume of securities they could sell over a period of
time.108 But the SOs may not have been affiliates. An “affiliate” is a
person that directly or indirectly controls, or is controlled by, or is
under common control with, the person specified; “control” means
the possession of the power to direct the management and policies of
a person through voting stock or otherwise.109 Although George
Grune was on the boards of both the SOs and Reader’s Digest, the
SOs held only nonvoting shares. There should not have been control
overlaps that would have required the SOs to be affiliates. Yet, the
SOs did not sell the stock and “could only watch as they missed better
investment possibilities.”110
Why could the supported public charities only watch? Some of
the directors of the SOs, it seems, were not fulfilling their fiduciary
duties.111 According to a newspaper article, “there [was] talk that
some decision-makers were keener to maintain good relations with
Reader’s Digest than to create a prudent investment portfolio and
were fearful that a fuller divestment could be interpreted as an af-
front.”112 If this characterization is accurate, it suggests that SO direc-
tors were breaching their fiduciary duty. The remark also suggests
that the supported public charity’s voice was not heard. Christine
DeVita, president of the Wallace–Reader’s Digest Funds, stated that
the supported public charities did participate in the decisions. She
said that the six-member boards of the SOs had only two directors
from the funds, and the decisions not to sell throughout the two de-
cades “were investment decisions in which the institutions partici-
pated.”113 Although the precise composition of each board was
108. According to Rule 144(e), the maximum amount of securities that may be sold by an
“affiliate” in a three-month period is the greater of (i) one percent of the shares of the class out-
standing; (ii) the average weekly reported volume of trading in the securities on all national se-
curities exchanges and NASDAQ during a specified four-week period; or (iii) the average
weekly volume of trading in the securities reported through the consolidated transaction re-
porting system contemplated by Rule 11Aa3-1 under the Exchange Act during the same four-
week period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1) (1999).
109. Id. § 230.405.
110. Blumenthal, supra note 10, at A1.
111. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1490 (1998)
(arguing that diversification should be a “necessary component of the charity fiduciary’s duty of
care”).
112. Id. at 1404 (quoting Jill J. Barshay, Macalester’s Stock Lagging: As Reader’s Digest
Shares Go, So Goes College Endowment Fund, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 22, 1997, at
D1).
113. Blumenthal, supra note 10, at A1.
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unique, there were generally two directors from the funds, two inde-
pendent directors, and only two directors from the supported public
charities.114
This composition of a supporting organization board—one-third
fund directors and one-third supported charity directors—seems not
to compromise their tax status. With only two of six directors being
“disqualified persons,” and without veto power, these SOs pass the
control test.115 The Type 3 interrelationship test calls for at least one
director appointed by or overlapping with the supported organization
such that the supported organization has a “significant voice.”116 Each
of the supported public charities had at least two directors sitting on
the boards of their respective SOs.117 Although the composition of
these boards of directors fell within the legal limits of the Code, New
York Attorney General Spitzer saw problems.118 He said that the
charitable structure “appeared to create a tension between the inter-
est of the parent company and the interests of the charity.”119
This tension was surely most acute in the supporting organization
boardrooms. An interesting example of boardroom decisionmaking
occurred in 1998, when the Reader’s Digest board finally agreed to
arrange for the seven supporting organizations to sell 12% of the
nonvoting stock in a trust arrangement—the first time the organiza-
tions had been allowed to sell stock since 1991.120 In the end, however,
the details of the arrangement benefited Reader’s Digest while hurt-
ing the organizations.121 Of this deal, which reduced the sale price of
114. Dewitt Wallace–Reader’s Digest Fund, Inc., IRS Form 990 (1998) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
115. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended in 1981).
117. This information is available on each organization’s IRS Form 990, which are on file
with the Office of the Attorney General of New York. The author’s notes, which summarize this
information, are on file with the Duke Law Journal.
118. Most likely the attorney general focused on several sections of the New York Not-For-
Profit Corporation Law. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) (Consol. 2001) (im-
posing an affirmative duty on directors of a not-for-profit corporation to discharge their duties
“in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions”). In addition, section 715 of the
NPCL contains specific rules regarding required conduct when there is a conflict of interest be-
tween directors and the not-for-profit corporation. Id. § 715.
119. Blumenthal, supra note 10, at A1.
120. Elsen, supra note 84. By law, charitable funds cannot issue stock, and therefore must
execute offerings through trusts. Sandler, supra note 97, at C2.
121. Sandler, supra note 97, at C2. According to the plan, the stock was sold in the form of a
hybrid security known as a traces offering. Stehle, supra note 87, at 21. Although the supporting
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the stock by 25%, a Morgan Stanley analyst said, “It’s not a particu-
larly good deal for the sellers.”122 Critics argued that Mr. Grune or-
chestrated the deal to benefit the company.123 In a case such as this,
the supported public charities need a way to ensure that their Type 3
supporting organizations are responsive to their needs.
B. The Responsiveness Requirement
Because Type 3 supporting organizations only have to be “oper-
ated in connection with” a public charity, the supported organizations
have a reduced ability to ensure that their needs are addressed. One
commentator explains the peculiar trade-off of Type 3 supporting or-
ganizations:
Here, the donors give money to a supporting organization that is not
controlled by the [public charity]. Rather the [public charity] only
has authority to appoint one member to the supporting organiza-
tion’s board, so the donors, while they can’t control the entity, don’t
have to give up control of it to the [public charity]. The cost of that is
the integral part test, which requires that 85 percent of the organiza-
tion’s net income each year has to flow up through the [public char-
ity].124
This commentator notes that the public charity can “only” appoint
one director to the Type 3, but says that the “cost” is the integral part
test. But the integral part test only ensures a percentage of net in-
come. What if the charity has a need other than simply income? As in
the Reader’s Digest example—in which the supporting organizations
had a sufficient number of public-charity directors—a supported or-
ganization might want the supporting organization to diversify the
SO’s portfolio. Hypothetically, if artwork is donated to a supporting
organization, the supporting organization should be responsive to the
public charity’s interests and sell that artwork should the public char-
ity need it to be sold. This kind of control cannot be guaranteed by
the integral part test.
organizations would get the dividends that they would have received for the next three years, as
well as a portion of any appreciation in the stock over those three years, they would get cash for
only three quarters of the value of their stock. Id.
122. Sandler, supra note 97, at C2.
123. Stehle, supra note 87, at 21.
124. Edited Transcript of the October 13, 2000 ABA Tax Section Exempt Organizations
Committee Meeting, 30 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 283, 304 (2000) (statement of Caplin & Drys-
dale Attorney Doug Varley).
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In addition to the integral part test, the supporting organization
should be restricted by the responsiveness test. The purpose of the re-
sponsiveness test is to ensure that the supporting organization “is re-
sponsive to the needs or demands of the publicly supported organiza-
tions.”125 This “significant voice” does not pertain just to net income;
the supported organization must be able to influence “the investment
policies of the supporting organization, the timing of grants, the man-
ner of making them, and the selection of recipients by such support-
ing organization, and in otherwise directing the use of the income or
assets of such supporting organization.”126
In public policy terms, the responsiveness test is important be-
cause the supporting organization’s public-charity status is derivative
of the public charity that it supports. Put another way, “the public
constituency that monitors a supporting organization’s operations
does so through the filter of an intervening public charity. It is to that
public charity or charities that the supporting organization must re-
spond regarding its organization, operation and on-going relationship
with the supported public charity or charities.”127 The supporting or-
ganization must be responsive to the public charity such that the sup-
porting organization deserves its public-charity status.
One or two public-charity directors on a board cannot ensure this
responsiveness. One commentator explained the problems with Type
3 supporting organizations when—as in the Reader’s Digest situa-
tion—the donor chooses one or two trustees of a five-person board,
or the donor is one of three directors.128 The commentator said, “The
charity . . . is not in a control position there, and then the independent
trustee is the donor’s lawyer, the donor’s advisor, the donor’s ac-
countant, the donor’s friend, and is somebody who will basically help
the donor accomplish his objectives, and it does become something of
a private foundation substitute.”129 When the IRS has problems with
donor control over a Type 3 organization, “usually the problem is re-
solved by putting an extra charity rep on the board.”130
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(i) (as amended in 1981).
126. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii)(d).
127. Victoria B. Bjorklund, When Is a Private Foundation the Best Option?, TR. & EST.,
Aug. 1993, at 12, 16.
128. Edited Transcript of the January 12, 2001 ABA Tax Section Exempt Organizations
Committee Meeting, 31 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 437, 468 (2001) (statement of Ropes & Gray
Attorney Carolyn M. Osteen).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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But if the IRS does not ask questions, and the donor who organ-
izes the supporting organization is not scrupulous, what option does a
supported public charity have to ensure responsiveness? If a Type 3
supporting organization is a charitable trust, this problem is solved:
the accountability test requires that the supported public charity be
named beneficiary, and that the supported public charity have the
power to enforce the trust.131 But if the public charity is supported by
a Type 3 supporting organization that is not a trust, it must rely on the
interrelationship test’s “significant voice” test—which requires at its
most stringent only one director.132 In this situation, the letter of the
law does not give a public charity enough power to ensure that its
voice is heard.
III.  PROPOSAL: MEMBERSHIP CORPORATIONS
One solution to these problems is simply to recommend the
elimination of the Type 3 supporting organization. A better answer,
however, would be to maintain some form of organization that is dif-
ferent from the Type 1 and the Type 2. More variety in charitable or-
ganizations offers donors more choices for giving and can have only a
positive impact on philanthropy.133
When considering changes to the § 509(a)(3) regulations, one
must keep in mind that “the removal of [the donor’s] control domi-
nates every part of this definition.”134 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has stated that for a supporting organization to maintain
public-charity status, the donor’s control cannot interfere with the
supported public charity’s needs:
Public charities were excepted from private foundation status on the
theory that their exposure to public scrutiny and their dependence
on public support would keep them from the abuses to which private
foundations were subject. Supporting organizations are similarly ex-
cepted in so far as they are subject to the scrutiny of a public charity.
The Treasury Regulations therefore provide that the supporting or-
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(iii).
132. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii).
133. See Laura Brown Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and Those Who
Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141, 152 (1995)
(“Both diversity and accountability are better served by structuring the legal rules so as to allow
and encourage formation and development of a variety of institutions, such that individuals can
find or form organizations that respond to their diverse preferences and priorities.”).
134. Bjorklund, supra note 4, at 91.
RAMBLER.DOC 03/01/02 1:15 PM
1392 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1367
ganization must be responsive to the needs of the public charity and
intimately involved in its operations.135
Here, the court stressed that the legislative history calls for a sound
responsiveness test. According to one commentator, “the public con-
stituency that monitors a supporting organization’s operations does so
through the filter of an intervening public charity.”136 But the “inter-
vening public charity” needs a tool to intervene and ensure respon-
siveness.
The responsiveness test should be changed to require that a Type
3 supporting organization fulfill either the accountability test or a re-
vised interrelationship test. If the Type 3 supporting organization is a
trust, the regulations require two safeguards. The accountability test
requires both that the organization be a “charitable trust” and that
the supported organization have the right to “enforce the trust”—to
bring abuses of the trust provisions to a court’s attention.137 First, if
the supporting organization is a “charitable trust,” this means that its
object is to benefit the community rather than private individuals, and
therefore the attorney general may enforce the trust.138 If the charita-
ble assets are jeopardized, the state attorney general has the power to
file suit or intervene by invoking the court's equitable powers.139 Sec-
ond, because the supported public charity must be named as a benefi-
ciary of the trust, it also has the legal power to enforce the trustees’
duty to comply with the terms of the trust.140
The new interrelationship test should include as much protection
as this accountability test. Since a Type 3 supporting organization that
is not a charitable trust will not be supervised in the same manner by
the state attorney general, the refined interrelationship test should
provide the public charity with significant control. The public charity
should be able to “enforce” its supporting organization.
The nonprofit organization should be a membership corporation
in which the majority of the members are elected by the supported
135. Quarrie Charitable Fund v. Comm’r, 603 F.2d 1274, 1277–78 (7th Cir. 1979).
136. Bjorklund, supra note 4, at 90.
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-(4)(i)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1981). The standard rule in trust law
is that the beneficiary has the power to enforce the trustee’s performance of her duties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197–199 (1959).
138. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 62 (2d ed.
2000).
139. Id. at 116.
140. Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 483 (1990).
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public charity or charities and have the power to vote the directors
out of office.141 The articles of incorporation and the bylaws of the
nonprofit membership corporation should contain appropriate provi-
sions.142 This structure, like a stock corporation in which shareholders
vote for directors,143 would be the principal check on the directors’
opportunities to be unresponsive to the supported public charity.144
If the public-charity members of the supporting organization
consider a decision to be important enough, these members can bring
that decision to the attention of the board of the supporting organiza-
tion. If the board of the supporting organization listens to the mem-
bers, then the supported organization has had a “significant voice.” If
the board does not act according to the wishes of the members, then
the members can vote off the directors. Thus, the supported public-
charity representatives who are members of the supporting organiza-
tion serve as watchdogs.145
The rationale for public-charity support tests is that an organiza-
tion dependent on the public for support, of necessity, will be respon-
sive to the public will.146 Here the rationale for the membership re-
quirement is that a board of directors that is dependent on public-
charity representatives for support, of necessity, will be responsive to
the public charity. If donors want to avoid the restrictions and taxes
on private foundations, they must allow the public charity to demand
responsiveness.
Practically, the provision should not change the way Type 3 sup-
porting organizations operate. The donors still will have the flexibility
to which they have become accustomed, and the donors never should
have expected the organization to be unresponsive to the public
141. The articles or the bylaws of the corporation should establish the criteria and proce-
dures for admission of the members. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (1988).
142. See id. § 2.01 (stating that the articles of incorporation for a nonprofit corporation must
state whether it will have members and may state the powers that its members will have).
143. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (1984) (establishing the number and election of direc-
tors); id. § 8.04 (providing for the election of directors by certain classes of shareholders); id.
§ 8.08 (providing for the removal of directors by shareholders).
144. Whether they are treated as just one species of corporation or as a special nonprofit
corporation, nonprofit membership corporations exist in every jurisdiction. Charles H. Steen &
Michael B. Hopkins, Corporate Governance Meets the Constitution: A Case Study of Nonprofit
Membership Corporations and Their Associational Standing Under Article III, 17 REV. LITIG.
209, 218 (1998).
145. But see Bjorklund, supra note 4, at 105 (“In the Type 3 trust, the named charities must
have the right to enforce the trust under state law but query whether one of 50 named benefici-
aries would risk the donor’s ire . . . to compel enforcement.”).
146. Change-All Souls Hous. Corp. v. United States, 671 F.2d 463, 465 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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charity’s needs. As promotional literature for U.S. Trust Corporation,
a company that has handled the assets for many of the country’s
wealthiest philanthropists, states: “donors to a supporting organiza-
tion must yield control of the organization to the public charity being
supported.”147
Although this new provision would increase the amount of con-
trol that the public charity would have over its Type 3 organization, it
would not effectively eliminate the advantages of the Type 3. The di-
rectors still would be responsible for the corporation’s day-to-day de-
cisions, and the public-charity members of the supporting organiza-
tion would not have any role in the operation of the supporting
organization.148 These members would be loath to vote off the direc-
tors because they would want to foster productive relationships on
the supporting organization board. And the public charity would be
loath to encourage its member-representatives to vote off the sup-
porting organization directors because it would want to maintain co-
operative relationships with its donors. This power would be reserved
for extreme situations.
Although some supporting organizations that are membership
corporations with the majority of their members appointed by the
supported public charities would naturally qualify as Type 1 or Type 2
supporting organizations, this would not necessarily be the case. In
order for an organization to qualify as a Type 1 supporting organiza-
tion, a majority of the officers, directors, or trustees of the supporting
organization are appointed or elected by the governing body, officers
acting in their official capacity, or the membership of the publicly
supported organizations.149 And the organization could qualify as a
Type 2 supporting organization if the control of the supporting or-
ganization is vested in the same persons that control or manage the
publicly supported organizations.150 But organizations in which the
public charities merely appoint members who they think will repre-
sent their interests would not qualify as Type 1 or Type 2. In this case,
donors could work with the supported public charities to choose the
147. U.S. Trust, Philanthropic Advisory Services, available at http://www.ustrust.com/ustrust/
html/individual/TrustsandEstates/Philanthropicadvisory.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2002) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
148. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1988) (stating that “[e]xcept as
provided in this Act or subsection (c), all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of, and the affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board”).
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g)(1) (as amended in 1981).
150. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(h)(1).
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members of the Type 3 supporting organization. Donors still would
be able to be more involved in the administration of the Type 3 or-
ganization than of the Type 1 or Type 2.
The argument could be made that a refinement is not necessary
because the IRS already has the tools to curtail abuses of the Type 3
organization. After all, § 501(c)(3) states that a donor cannot enter
into any transactions that might result in inurement or excessive pri-
vate benefits.151 And more importantly, the organization must pass the
control test, which mandates that a supporting organization cannot be
controlled by disqualified persons.152 The Internal Revenue Code
states that a supporting organization cannot be controlled even indi-
rectly by substantial contributors to the fund. The regulations note
that this determination of whether a disqualified person does in fact
indirectly control an organization is a matter of “facts and circum-
stances.”153 In fact, in the 2001 Continuing Professional Education
(CPE) text for exempt organizations, the IRS states that Type 3 sup-
porting organizations “have a greater proclivity to display facts and
circumstances tending to show that [disqualified persons] directly or
indirectly control the [supporting organizations],”154 and indicated
that it will step up enforcement. In this CPE text, the IRS stresses that
disqualified persons cannot indirectly control Type 3 organizations
and gave four examples of “control.”155
But the basic § 501(c)(3) protection and the § 509(a)(3) control
test are not enough. There are myriad ways a supporting organization
might be unresponsive to its supported public charity. The IRS can-
not evaluate all of these complex relationships behind the closed
doors of boardrooms and carry out the sophisticated analysis neces-
sary to determine if the supporting organization is responding to the
151. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
152. Id. § 509(a)(3)(C).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(j)(1).
154. Ron Shoemaker & Bill Brockner, IRS, Continuing Professional Education Text for Fis-
cal 2001: Topic G, Control and Power: Issues Involving Supporting Organizations, Donor Ad-
vised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 8, 2000.
155. The first example stated that employees of a disqualified person will be considered in
the “facts and circumstances.” Id. The second example stated that a partner in a law firm that
represents a disqualified person also may be disqualified. Id. The third example analyzes a com-
plex hypothetical trustee structure and notes that the IRS will look closely at any board mem-
bers that a disqualified person selects for the board, any committees controlled by disqualified
persons that nominate board members, and any bylaws that provide that disqualified members
cannot be removed, even for cause. Id. In the last example, the IRS explains that it will consider
any of the supporting organization’s assets that are controlled by a disqualified person. Id.
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public charity’s needs. In fact, the IRS seems daunted by such a pros-
pect; in one recent private letter ruling, the Service did not even ana-
lyze whether the public charity had a “significant voice” before it
blessed the supporting organization.156 Empowering the public chari-
ties with this new responsiveness test will allow the supported public
charities to police themselves.
CONCLUSION
One tax commentator has stated that “[t]he advantages of the
supporting organization over the private foundation are of such sig-
nificance that rarely, if ever, will the private foundation constitute the
preferred format in a particular instance.”157 Supporting organizations
provide an important option for philanthropists. It should not be the
case, however, that foundations are “rarely, if ever” preferred.
After the Reader’s Digest settlement was announced, New York
Attorney General Spitzer said, “‘The charitable entities that will re-
ceive the money will now be in a position to control their own fate
and pursue their charitable ends in their own way without being de-
pendent in any way on any control by Reader’s Digest.’”158 The way in
which the Type 3 organizations had been operated denied the public
charities the “control” that they deserved.
Public charities will have more control if they can ensure that
Type 3 supporting organizations are responsive to their needs. This
responsiveness can be accomplished by requiring the Type 3 organi-
zations to be either enforceable charitable trusts or corporations
whose members are elected by the supported public charity. Respon-
siveness is vital because as long as Type 3 supporting organizations
receive the tax treatment of a public charity, the government is losing
those funds. And as long as the government is losing those funds, the
donations should be used as the public charity wants and needs. A
donor who desires more day-to-day involvement in her supporting
organization still should choose a Type 3, but she must concede that
should the public charity have needs that are not being met, it may act
to fulfill those needs.
156. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-52-088 (Oct. 1, 1999).
157. Gerald B. Treacy, Jr., Supporting Organizations: A Good Alternative to Private Foun-
dations, 24 EST. PLAN. 17, 21 (1997).
158. Blumenthal, supra note 10, at A1 (quoting Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, State of
New York).
